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Abstract

Author Manuscript

Behavioral interventions have been shown to have powerful effects on human behavior both
outside of and within the context of health care. As organizations increasingly adopt behavioral
architecture, care must be taken to consider its potential negative consequences. An evidencedbased approach is best, whereby interventions that might have a significant deleterious effect on
patients’ health outcomes are first tested and rigorously evaluated before being systematically
rolled out. In the case of clinical decision support, brief and thorough instructions should be
provided for use. Physician performance when using these systems is best measured relatively, in
the context of peers with similar training. Responsibility for errors must be shared with clinical
team members and system designers.

Editor’s Note
The case to which this commentary is a response was developed by the editorial staff.

Case
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Dr R is an internal medicine resident physician in the medical intensive care unit (MICU)
who just admitted Ms M, a 60-year-old woman, for an acute exacerbation of her chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease. Based on her worsening respiratory status, Dr R determines
that she needs mechanical ventilatory support. Through the hospital’s electronic health
management system (EHMS) and computerized physician order entry system (CPOE),1 Dr
R automates2 Ms M’s pressure support settings.
Later that night, Dr R is paged. Ms M’s respiratory status has deteriorated, probably due to
ventilator-induced barotrauma. Despite the MICU team’s implementation of full corrective
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and supportive measures, Ms M is pronounced dead 8 hours after being admitted to the
MICU.
Reasons for Ms M’s outcome are investigated by the hospital’s patient safety and oversight
committee. Members of the committee suspect that Dr R selected ventilator settings that
were too high for Ms M. When asked to explain, Dr R admits to feeling terrible and to only
now understanding that default settings,3 presented by the EHMS and selected by colleagues
and supervisors in past cases,1 were not appropriate for Ms M.
Committee members deliberate about how to respond.

Commentary
Author Manuscript

In this case of a physician’s reliance on CPOE default settings leading to the death of his
patient, the hospital’s patient safety and oversight committee has a duty to respond in a way
that will decrease the likelihood of similar events in the future. In order to decide on a
productive response, they must consider the effect of the CPOE default settings on Dr R’s
behavior. The committee should address the following questions: (1) How do we evaluate
physician performance and determine responsibility for errors in the context of behavioral
architecture in health care? and (2) how should error events inform the design of future
interventions? To address these questions, the committee must first reflect on the role of
behavioral architecture in health care.
Behavioral Architecture
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Behavioral architecture refers to the intentional design of systems that consider and account
for the psychological, social, cognitive, and emotional factors that influence the behavior of
individuals. Many insights and tools of behavioral architecture are borrowed from the field
of behavioral economics. The fundamental premise of this field is that human beings do not
make decisions based purely on rational calculations designed to maximize their own good.
Instead, we behave in ways that are predictably irrational.4 We can use an understanding of
these tendencies to develop ways to support, encourage, and “nudge” desirable behaviors.
Nudges are behavioral science applications that consist of “positive reinforcement and
indirect suggestions which have a non-forced effect on decision making.”5 For example, a
cafeteria encourages healthy food choices by putting fruit next to the cash register instead of
candy bars.5
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Health care is rapidly adopting insights from the field of behavioral economics. There is a
growing body of evidence demonstrating that clinician decisions are also subject to
variability based on psychological and emotional factors.6,7,8 Rational approaches to
improving clinician behavior, such as education, feedback, and financial incentives, have
only been modestly successful. For example, these approaches generally reduce
inappropriate antibiotic prescribing by 10%.9,10 However, recent studies using behavioral
interventions have shown exciting and promising results. For example, a large randomized
controlled trial evaluating 3 behavioral interventions found that a peer comparison nudge
decreased clinician antibiotic prescribing for upper respiratory infections by roughly 80%
(from 19.9% to 3.7%),11 with durable effects at 5 months.12
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Default settings like the ones encountered by Dr R represent particularly powerful
behavioral architecture tools. They take advantage of our strong desire to do nothing (status
quo bias13) and implicitly recommend a particular action.5 Outside of health care, default
options for organ donation consent in European countries led to a 16.3% increase in organ
donation.14 At one US hospital, switching from opt-in to opt-out referral for cardiac
rehabilitation increased referral rates from up to 15% to up to 90%.15 We can expect that
when a health care system puts defaults into effect, it will have a significant effect on the
behavior of physicians. These effects are likely to be more pronounced for physicians in
training, like Dr R, who possess less knowledge, understanding, and confidence at this stage
in their careers.
Weighing the Pros and Cons
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Behavioral design is most useful in situations in which people need to make decisions that
are difficult, with delayed consequences, and for which they get little or no consistent
feedback.5 These types of decisions are rife throughout health care. A few times a week, a
primary care physician will decide to start a patient, with no history of heart disease, on a
medicine to lower their cholesterol. This decision involves a complex calculation of that
patient’s 10-year risk of developing heart disease. The benefit will come much later, if at all,
and, as a result, the physician will get almost no feedback on the development of heart
disease in such patients many years later. Even in acute care settings, clinicians often face
these types of decisions. Dr R received swift feedback on his choice of ventilator settings
from the patient safety and oversight committee, but, typically, this type of mistake would
not generate this level of feedback. Perhaps partly for this reason, clinicians often fail to
provide evidence-based care. US citizens who’ve seen a clinician in the past 2 years receive
only half of recommended medical care,16 and most physicians believe that at least 15% to
30% of the care received is unnecessary.17
In part because of the failure to follow evidenced-based guidelines,18 preventable harm is
responsible for a third of hospital deaths,19 and it wasted up to $425 billion in 2011.20 The
use of behavioral design in health systems is an exciting and low-cost way to close this
evidence-practice gap without undermining the autonomy of clinicians. Studies have shown
that even small and very low-cost cost nudges can have a meaningful impact. One study
placed a simple poster with the clinician’s signature committing to antibiotic stewardship in
each examination room to decrease inappropriate antibiotic prescribing by 20% relative to
the control group.7 And simply changing the grouping of treatment options in the EHMS has
been demonstrated to significantly affect physician prescribing behavior.21
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As we begin to integrate behavioral psychology into health care to a greater extent, we must
also consider the potential negative consequences. Some might worry that these behavioral
architecture interventions undermine incentives to think critically and will usher in a new era
of clinicians who are dependent on these tools. Dr R did not modify the default settings
because he did not know that he needed to adjust them. Had there been no default settings,
Dr R would have been prompted to think critically about how to manage Ms M. Yet the
default settings arguably helped many other physicians in this MICU avoid simple input
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errors. These types of interventions can lead to errors and still have a net positive effect on
patients.
Behavioral design also creates a challenge in ensuring transparency. The key insight of the
field of behavioral economics has been compared to that of an optical illusion, in which our
minds play tricks on us.5 Normally, the human mind works incredibly well. However, there
are a few instances in which it predictably fails. Behavioral design choices, or nudges, serve
as a sort of cognitive illusion influencing perception below conscious awareness. This useful
and powerful analogy of course begets concern. Health care systems must take responsibility
for the effect of these hidden-in-plain sight interventions. For example, many academic
centers now bar pharmaceutical sales representatives after studies showed that simply their
presence influenced physician prescribing behavior.22
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All systems incorporate a choice architecture. Health care systems should do so
intentionally, by designing systems with the goal of providing the best care for as many
patients as possible. To meet this goal, the net effect of system design choices should be
measured in terms of patient outcomes. In this case, the committee must consider the net
effect of the mechanical ventilator default settings on process and clinical outcomes.
Evaluating the Quality of Clinicians’ Performance
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The many difficulties of accurately measuring clinician performance have been detailed
elsewhere.23 Putting these issues aside, health care systems must decide on the best ways to
evaluate physicians in the context of behavioral architecture. I believe clinician performance
should be evaluated relative to that of other physicians at their training level who are
experiencing the same behavioral architecture. With a thorough understanding of the
powerful impact of defaults—and how trainees in particular can be effected by them—the
committee might consider that any of Dr R’s peers would be subject to making the same
mistake, in which case, he should not be subject to disciplinary action.
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However, Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, the authors of Nudge:
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, might disagree, as they refer to
the application of behavioral architecture in policy as “libertarian paternalism.”5 In this case,
they use the word libertarian to mean liberty preserving. Clinicians still have a full range of
options and, as such, should take complete responsibility for outcomes. The defaults
encountered by Dr R could have easily been changed had he possessed the clinical
knowledge to do so. The counterargument would be that though these interventions don’t
restrict physician choice, they do significantly impact behavior and often without conscious
awareness. Because these tools have been shown to have strong effects on behavior,
physicians can only be properly judged relative to their peers who have been presented with
the same choice architecture.
Updating Foundational Principles About Clinician Responsibility
Our instincts about physician responsibility for patient safety and well-being are based on
20th-century ethical norms. Home visits that consisted of only a patient and physician
progressed to hospitalized care wherein the physician was the ultimate authority and in
complete control of every aspect of patient care.24 In the 21st century, the clinician is no
AMA J Ethics. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 November 02.
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longer the “captain of the ship,” as specialized knowledge and medical science have grown
beyond the level of expertise achievable by one human being. Perhaps more importantly,
medicine has become big business, as power has been transferred from physicians to
complexes of medical schools and hospitals, financing and regulatory agencies, and health
insurance companies. Instead of being captains of the ship, physicians are now employees
and team members.
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In this case, the health care team and the health system in which it functions must both share
responsibility for the error that resulted in the death of Ms M. The ventilator settings placed
by Dr R should have been checked by a fellow or attending physician overseeing the MICU
during that shift. Dr R did not have the proper level of supervision and, as such, his senior
deserves some responsibility for the error. The health care system likely deserves some
responsibility as well. The CPOE system likely did not include clear instructions for use.
Without these, it would not be unreasonable for a trainee to assume that the default settings
should have been used for Ms M. Appropriately distributing responsibility for patient care to
all members of the health care team encourages each member to provide the best care. In the
case of process interventions, like the CPOE tool in this case and in clinical decision support
generally, we must insist that these tools not only be well intentioned but also be proven
effective in pragmatic trials.
Developing Future Behavioral Interventions and Clinical Decision Support
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The vast majority of clinical decision support tools integrated into EHMS across the country
have not been proven to either help or reliably not harm patients, as most evaluations of
quality come from just a few institutions across the country.25 Our approach as a nation to
integrating EHMS and all of their components has been to develop and deploy tools that
simply make intuitive sense. We are just beginning to discover and describe the unforeseen
negative consequences of this approach.26,27,28 Western medicine was revolutionized with
the advent and spread of the concept of evidenced-based medicine in the 1980s. The premise
was simple: deemphasize intuition, clinical experience, and pathophysiological rationale in
favor of hard scientific evidence.29 This concept has not been applied to the development of
EHMS and clinical decision support. Many of the tools in these systems are included simply
because they made intuitive sense to the designers. There must always be some intelligent
balance between our use of intuition and objective evidence to make decisions. In this case,
the health care system that launched the default CPOE should have gathered more evidence
about its effects before launching it in this high-risk clinical setting.
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The committee can consider 2 recommendations that might decrease the likelihood of
similar events in the future. First, an evidenced-based approach should be taken for
behavioral interventions that might significantly and negatively impact a patient’s health. For
example, before a default system like this one is launched in the MICU, the hospital might
first conduct a small pragmatic trial of a similar tool in a low-stakes clinical situation. With
the knowledge and understanding gained from that study, developers might build a better
CPOE tool for the MICU. Ideally, this new tool would be launched on a small scale and its
effects closely monitored before permanent full-scale integration. Second, it is imperative
that clinicians understand the basis of recommendations generated by the CPOE tool and
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how it should be used. Particularly relevant for clinical decision support, the 21st Century
Cures Act requires that health care professionals be able to independently review the basis of
recommendations of decision support systems.30 Brief and thorough instructions for use
should be provided to empower the clinician to use the tool to best care for each individual
patient. Building added transparency into the development of future interventions should
reduce the likelihood of negative events.
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